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Abstract
In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and
Segal and Whinston (2000b), we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to ex-
clusion in the lab, and whether it leads to lower exclusion costs for the incumbent, than simultaneous
contracting. We ﬁnd that an incumbent who proposes exclusive contracts to buyers sequentially, is
better able to deter entry than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously. In contrast
to theory, this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent.
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Since the beginning of the 20th century courts have treated ﬁrms using exclusive contracts harshly
for fear such contracts could be used to exclude rivals and, thus, hamper competition.2 Starting
in the 1950s, scholars belonging to the Chicago school (see, e.g., Director and Levi, 1956; Posner,
1976; Bork, 1978) argued that such fears are not warranted since using exclusive contracts for the sole
purpose of anti-competitively excluding rivals would not be in the interest of rational proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms. Recently, this view on exclusive dealing has been challenged by various theorists who describe
circumstances under which anti-competitive exclusion of rivals can be proﬁtably used by dominant
ﬁrms. One prominent contribution to this literature is the naked exclusion model put forward by
Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000b) [henceforth RRW-SW].3
Consider an incumbent seller, a more eﬃcient entrant and two buyers with independent demand.
Due to economies of scale caused by, for instance, ﬁxed entry costs the entrant needs both buyers to
be “free” (i.e., not bound by exclusive contracts with the incumbent) to enter the market proﬁtably.
An exclusive contract in this framework takes the form of a payment from the incumbent to a buyer in
exchange for the buyer’s promise to buy exclusively from the incumbent. RRW-SW show that, under
mild assumptions, the incumbent needs to “convince” only one buyer in the market to sign an exclusive
contract to deter entry and extract monopoly proﬁts from both buyers. Indeed, compensating one
buyer for the forgone consumer surplus that results from dealing with the incumbent—sometimes
referred to as a “divide-and-conquer” strategy—is suﬃcient to obtain exclusion in the case diﬀerent
contracts can be proposed to the two buyers. Moreover, if buyers are approached sequentially, exclusion
is achieved at negligible costs. The idea is that the ﬁrst buyer anticipates that, if he rejects a contract,
the incumbent can surely convince the second buyer to accept by making him an oﬀer he cannot
refuse. Hence, the ﬁrst buyer will accept any, even a “lousy” oﬀer, which deters entry. This stands in
2Early cases include Standard Fashion Company v. Margrane-Houston Company [258 U.S. 346 (1922)] and United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America [148 F.2d 416 (1945)]. More recent cases include Microsoft [253 F.3d 34 (2001)],
U.S. v. Dentsply [399 F.3d (2001)], Conwood v. United State Tobacco [290 f.3d 758 (2002)] in the US and the Intel case
[C227 (2009)] in Europe.
3The term “naked” refers to the sole purpose of an exclusive deal to audaciously exclude a rival without oﬀering
any eﬃciency justiﬁcation. Other models study exclusive dealing in a related context. Aghion and Bolton (1987), for
example, include damage penalty provisions in their model. Innes and Sexton (1994) allow for buyers to vertically
integrate. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) model exclusive dealing in a multi-market case. Fumagalli and Motta (2006),
Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) and Wright (2009) take into account that buyers might be ﬁrms that compete in a
downstream consumer market.
1contrast to the case where it is impossible for the incumbent to discriminate between the buyers. In
this case exclusion is not guaranteed: the monopoly proﬁt the incumbent would earn under exclusion
is not suﬃciently high to compensate both buyers for their forgone surplus. The buyers’ subgame is
then a symmetric coordination game with multiple equilibria and exclusion occurs only if the buyers
fail to coordinate on the (more eﬃcient) rejection equilibrium.
In this paper we examine whether sequential (discriminatory) contracting is more conducive to
exclusion in the lab than simultaneous contracting. Moreover, we study whether exclusion costs under
sequential contracting are negligible as suggested by theory. In the light of the experimental literature
on bargaining games, in particular the ultimatum game (see G¨ uth, 1995; Roth, 1995, for overviews),
it is questionable whether the ﬁrst buyer will accept any oﬀered payment, even very small ones—an
assumption on which the result of exclusion at negligible costs rests.
Our paper is the ﬁrst to study exclusive dealing in an experiment with sequential contracting.
Spier and Landeo (2009) report experimental evidence showing that the theoretical diﬀerence in ex-
clusion rates between simultaneous discriminatory and simultaneous non-discriminatory regimes is
not that important from a behavioral perspective. In fact, when the buyers cannot communicate,
the exclusion rate is not higher in a discriminatory than in a non-discriminatory regime.4 Moreover,
when the buyers can communicate, they succeed reasonably well in coordinating to reject their oﬀered
contracts such that no exclusion occurs. Spier and Landeo (2009) focus on the case of simultaneous
contracting.5 In our paper, we show that if the discriminatory regime is one of sequential contracting,
exclusion rates do increase above the level obtained under no discrimination. We also show that, in
contrast to theory, exclusion costs are substantial under sequential contracting.
There are only a few empirical studies analyzing the eﬀects of exclusive contracts; most of them
deal with analyzing their eﬀect on prices and welfare in the beer industry. The results are mixed. For
instance, whereas Slade (2000) ﬁnds a negative eﬀect of exclusive contracts on consumer welfare, Sass
(2005), Asker (2004), and Asker (2005) report a positive eﬀect. Furthermore, Heide, Dutta and Bergen
(1998) conducted survey research in the machinery and electronic equipment sector and ﬁnd that
“business eﬃciency factors play a signiﬁcant role in ﬁrms’ decisions regarding exclusive dealing” (p.
387). Whinston (2006) and Lafontaine and Slade (2008) have lamented the paucity of ﬁeld studies
4When the buyers are able to communicate, the predicted diﬀerence in exclusion rates between both regimes occurs
because the buyers coordinate better on the rejection equilibrium in the no-discriminatory case.
5Another experimental study on simultaneous exclusive dealing is Smith (2010). Smith focuses on the case where an
incumbent cannot discriminate between buyers, and ﬁnds that the likelihood of exclusion increases when the incumbent
needs fewer buyers to sign exclusive contracts for entry to be deterred.
2analyzing the eﬀect of exclusive contracts on competition. This report from the lab adds to the ongoing
discussion on the eﬀects of exclusive dealing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the naked exclusion
model. Section 3 contains the experimental design and procedures, and the hypotheses. In Section 4,
we report the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theory
The RRW-SW model features an incumbent seller, a more eﬃcient entrant, and, in our implementation,
two buyers with independent demand who are ﬁnal consumers. Due to, for instance, ﬁxed entry costs,
the entrant needs to sell to both buyers to make entry proﬁtable. Therefore, if the incumbent can
induce at least one of the two buyers to sign an exclusive contract, entry is deterred.6
The model has four stages. In a ﬁrst stage, the incumbent oﬀers to pay x1, x2 2 f0;1;2;:::g to
buyer 1 and 2, respectively, and, in a second stage, the buyers either accept or reject the proposed
amount. By accepting, a buyer signs a contract with the incumbent in which he promises to buy
exclusively from the incumbent. In a third stage, the decisions of the two buyers become publicly
known and the entrant decides about entry. In a fourth stage, all active ﬁrms set prices and payoﬀs
ensue.7
In the case where both buyers reject the incumbent’s oﬀer and entry occurs, the entrant will set
a price slightly below or equal to the incumbent’s unit production cost. The entrant will thus sell to
both free buyers. This leaves the incumbent with zero proﬁt and generates a “high” surplus for each
buyer. If entry does not occur, the incumbent has monopoly power and monopoly pricing leads to
higher prices and thus “low” buyer surplus.
In our experiment, the monopoly proﬁt is equal to 500 such that the incumbent earns 500 minus
the sum of the accepted payments in the case of exclusion. In the case of entry the incumbent earns
50. (See the lower part of Table 1.) The payoﬀ matrix of the buyers is as shown in the upper part of
Table 1.8 To illustrate, if at least one buyer i accepts payment xi oﬀered by the incumbent, entry is
6RRW-SW analyze the general case with N  2 buyers, where the entrant enters the market if and only if the number
of buyers that sign exclusive contracts is smaller than N
 with 1  N
  N.
7In our experiment, we focus on the interaction between the incumbent and the buyers. Hence, we will collapse the
four-stage game into a two-stage game assuming subgame-perfect behavior in stages 3 and 4 (just like Spier and Landeo,
2009; Smith, 2010). See Section 3 for more details on the design.
8In the parametric example underlying our experiment, the incumbent has unit production costs of cI = 20 and the
entrant has unit production costs of cE = 0. A buyer’s demand is given by D(p) = 50   p. The consumer surplus for
3Table 1: Payoﬀs
Buyers’ payoﬀs
Decision of Buyer 2
Accept Reject
Decision of Accept 165 + x1, 165 + x2 165 + x1, 165
Buyer 1 Reject 165, 165 + x2 500, 500
Incumbent’s payoﬀs
If no buyer If only buyer If both buyers
accepts i accepts accept
50 500   xi 500   x1   x2
deterred and the accepting buyers earn 165 + xi. A buyer who rejects, earns 165 in the case of entry
deterrence. If both buyers reject, the more eﬃcient entrant enters the market, and the buyers earn
500 each. The extra consumer surplus of entry for a single buyer is thus equal to 335.
In our experiment we focus on the case where the incumbent can oﬀer payments to buyers sequen-
tially. However, since we are interested in comparative statics, we study whether sequential contracting
leads to diﬀerent exclusion rates than simultaneous contracting. In particular, we compare outcomes
under sequential contracting to two benchmark cases: one with simultaneous non-discriminatory con-
tracting and one with simultaneous discriminatory contracting. Hence, we ﬁrst discuss both cases of
simultaneous contracting.
If the incumbent approaches both buyers simultaneously and cannot discriminate between buyers,
such that x1 = x2 = x, both exclusionary and non-exclusionary equilibria exist. To ensure exclusion in
this case, the incumbent would have to oﬀer x > 335 such that both buyers are sure to accept. However,
the incumbent is not in the position to oﬀer an amount that high since it would lead to a loss on his
side (2  335 > 500   50). Therefore, given that x  335, the buyers play a symmetric coordination
game. In particular, there are two classes of subgame-perfect equilibria: exclusion equilibria where
each buyer is CS
E = 450 under entry and CS
I = 112:5 (rounded at 115) under exclusion. The incumbent’s proﬁt is
zero under entry and 450 minus the sum of the accepted oﬀers under exclusion. In order to avoid zero earnings for
the incumbent in the case entry occurs, and thus potential frustration on the part of subjects acting in the role of an
incumbent in the experiment, we add 50 to the payoﬀs of all active players (so also to CS
I and CS
E). This generates
payoﬀs as mentionned in the text and in Table 1.
4x 2 [0;225] and both buyers accept9 and no-exclusion equilibria where x 2 [0;335] and both buyers
reject. Successful exclusion is thus obtained if buyers fail to coordinate on rejecting the incumbent’s
payment.10 We refer to the game in which the incumbent makes oﬀers simultaneously and cannot
discriminate between buyers as SimNon.11
Let us now turn to the case in which the incumbent can discriminate between the buyers but
still makes oﬀers simultaneously—both of which are observable by the buyers before they make their
decision. We refer to this game as SimDis. Given that the monopoly proﬁt is suﬃciently high to
convince one buyer to sign an exclusionary contract (450 > 335), the entrant can be excluded with
certainty (see case A of Proposition 3 in Segal and Whinston, 2000b) and only exclusionary equilibria
exist. The costs of exclusion (i.e., the sum of accepted oﬀers) lie anywhere between zero and 336.
Indeed, in one subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium the incumbent oﬀers a payment of 335 or 336 to
one buyer, who accepts, and zero to the other buyer, who rejects. In other subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria, oﬀers to both buyers are positive and sum up to an amount smaller than or equal to 336
and both buyers accept.12
In the case of sequential contracting, which is the main focus of our experiment, the incumbent
ﬁrst makes an oﬀer to one buyer (“buyer 1”) who decides whether to accept or reject. Then—knowing
the decision of buyer 1—the incumbent makes an oﬀer to the other buyer (“buyer 2”) who—after
being informed about buyer 1’s decision—also decides whether to accept or reject. In this game,
exclusion again arises for sure and (almost) for free. Indeed, in the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
the incumbent oﬀers zero or one to buyer 1, who accepts, and zero to buyer 2, who rejects or accepts.
The reason that buyer 1 accepts a payment of zero or one is that he knows that if he would reject, the
incumbent would make buyer 2 an oﬀer he cannot refuse (> 335). Given that buyer 1 accepts (which
already deters entry), buyer 2 is oﬀered zero.
9The upper bound on oﬀers in this class of equilibria is due to the fact that for oﬀers x > 225 incumbents would make
losses.
10In the buyers’ subgame, risk dominance predicts that both buyers reject if x < 167:5 and both buyers accept if
x > 167:5. Buyers are indiﬀerent for x = 167:5 (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Note also that only non-exclusionary
equilibria are perfectly coalition-proof (see Segal and Whinston, 2000b).
11We focus on pure strategy equilibria. There also exist mixed strategy equilibria in the buyers’ subgame. These
have the property that the probability of acceptance decreases with the oﬀer in order to keep the other buyer indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting. As this property is clearly rejected by the data—the probability of acceptance increases
with the oﬀer (see Table 6)—we do not consider equilibria in mixed strategies here.
12In the buyers’ subgame, risk dominance predicts that both buyers accept if x1x2 > (335   x1)(x2   335), or equiva-
lently, x1 +x2 > 335. If x1 +x2 < 335 both buyers reject and if x1 +x2 = 335 they are indiﬀerent (Harsanyi and Selten,
1988).
5Table 2: Theoretical predictions
Exclusion rate Exclusion costs
SimNon 2 [0;100%] 2 [0;450]
SimDis 100% 2 [0;336]
Seq-P 100% 2 [0;1]
Seq-S 100% 2 [0;1]
Note: The predictions are derived from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
In our experiment, we have two versions of the sequential contracting game. In both versions,
buyer 2 observes the decision of buyer 1. But whereas in one version buyer 2 observes the oﬀer made
to buyer 1, in the other version buyer 2 does not observe the oﬀer made to buyer 1. We refer to the
ﬁrst as Seq-P, where the “P” stands for publicity of oﬀer 1, and to the second as Seq-S, where the
“S” stands for secrecy of oﬀer 1. Keeping secret oﬀer 1 for buyer 2 is inconsequential for the subgame-
perfect equilibrium outcome. However, we include Seq-S in our experiment in order to bring the
laboratory setting closer to a real-life setting as it is not likely that payments oﬀered by incumbents
are publicly observable.
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical predictions. Exclusion costs are deﬁned as the sum of accepted
oﬀers given exclusion. (Recall that exclusion occurs if at least one buyer accepts his oﬀer.)
3. Experimental procedures and hypotheses
The experiment was run in June 2010 in the CEE lab at the University of Copenhagen with 198
students from diﬀerent ﬁelds of study.13 Sessions took about 90 minutes and participants earned EUR
19 on average.
As mentioned before, in our experiment we focus on the interaction between the incumbent and the
buyers (like Spier and Landeo, 2009; Smith, 2010), which in our view is the crux of the naked-exclusion
model. Therefore, there is no entrant present in our experiments and we collapse the multiple-stage
game into a two-stage game, assuming subgame-perfect behavior of the entrant (and the incumbent)
with respect to both entry and pricing decisions.14 This allows the construction of a payoﬀ table for
13We used the z-Tree toolbox (Fischbacher, 2007) to program the software used in this experiment.
14In our opinion it is the coordination problem of the buyers and the (in)ability of the incumbent to take advantage of
the externality buyers exert on each other that are the most interesting aspects of the naked-exclusion model. Moreover,
6buyers as shown in Table 1, which we also used in the experiments. All participants in a session received
the same instructions, containing the payoﬀ function of the incumbent and the buyers.15 Subjects
were informed that monetary earnings would depend on the cumulative earnings made throughout
the experiment. In the instructions, payoﬀs were denoted in points and, in order to cover potential
losses of participants acting in the role of an incumbent, all participants were initially endowed with
1600 points. The conversion rate of points into DKK was 500 points = DKK 10. After reading the
instructions, subjects were randomly assigned a role, which was ﬁxed throughout the experiment.16
The experiment has four treatments that correspond to each of the four games described in Section
2, and each subject participated in one of the four treatments only. Table 3 provides an overview of
our treatments. In all treatments, the same game was repeated twenty times in order to allow for
learning. After each repetition, feedback was provided to incumbents and buyers about acceptance
decisions and own payoﬀs, and participants were randomly rematched within matching groups of nine
subjects each (three incumbents and six buyers). In SimDis buyers were informed about both oﬀers
before they made their decision.17 In Seq-P, buyer 2 was informed about buyer 1’s decision before
he made his decision, and about the oﬀer buyer 1 received. In Seq-S, buyer 2 was informed about
buyer 1’s decision before he made his decision, but not so about the oﬀer buyer 1 received.18 In both
of these sequential treatments, the incumbent made an oﬀer to buyer 2 after having learned about the
decision of buyer 1.
The RRW-SW model predicts that under SimNon, there is a multiplicity of equilibria where either
both buyers reject or both buyers accept the oﬀer made by the incumbent. The average exclusion
Boone, Chaudhuri and M¨ uller (2010) conduct experimental Bertrand markets with asymmetric unit costs. They show
that these markets work as theory predicts in the sense that the most eﬃcient ﬁrm sets a price slightly below the unit
cost of the second most eﬃcient ﬁrm. Given these results, the only question left in the context of the naked-exclusion
model is whether entry happens when it is proﬁtable. We thought this is of lesser interest. For a similar approach, see,
e.g., the limit-pricing experiments by Cooper, Gravin and Kagel (1997).
15Instructions can be found in Section A.3 of the Appendix.
16In the experiment we used neutral wording and did not mention the existence of a potential entrant. An incumbent
was called an A-participant and buyers were called B-participants.
17We also ran a simultaneous discriminatory treatment where buyers were not informed about the oﬀer made to the
other buyer. In this case, assuming passive beliefs, the unique (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium predicts the incumbent
to oﬀer (x1;x2) = (0;0) and both buyers accept. Results from this treatment are very similar to those reported by
Spier and Landeo (2009): the exclusion rate is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the ones observed in treatments SimNon
and SimDis and exclusion costs are signiﬁcantly lower than in treatment SimNon.
18Participants acting in the role of a buyer in the three discriminatory treatments alternated between being buyer
1 (“B1”) and buyer 2 (“B2”) and were informed about this. This switching was implemented in order to avoid the
possibility that an incumbent always discriminated the same buyer subject.
7Table 3: Overview of treatments and number of observations
Treatment Sequential Full info # Subjects # Matching groups
1 SimNon no yes 45 5
2 SimDis no yes 54 6
3 Seq-P yes yes 45 5
4 Seq-S yes no 54 6
Total 198 22
rate can thus lie anywhere between 0 and 1. Under a discriminatory regime, however, both buyers
rejecting cannot be part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Nor does it matter whether within
the sequential regimes buyer 2 observes the (either accepted or rejected) amount oﬀered to buyer 1.
Knowing that the incumbent can always oﬀer an amount such that it is a dominant choice for buyer
2 to accept, buyer 1 should accept any oﬀer, irrespective of whether the information about the size of
the oﬀer is communicated to buyer 2. Therefore, in the discriminatory treatments the exclusion rate
should be 100%. Hypothesis 1 is thus formulated as follows.
Hypothesis 1 Exclusion rates in SimDis, Seq-P and Seq-S are higher than in SimNon, as long
as the exclusion rate is strictly below 100% in the latter treatment.
Exclusion costs are expected to be lower in the case of sequential contracting than in the case of simul-
taneous contracting. Indeed, under sequential contracting exclusion should be obtained at negligible
costs.
Hypothesis 2 Exclusion costs are lower in Seq-P and Seq-S compared to SimNon and SimDis,
as long as they are strictly above zero in the latter two treatments.
4. Results
In Subsection 4.1 we present the aggregate results and focus on diﬀerences across treatments. In
Subsection 4.2 we take a closer look at behavior of incumbents and buyers in each of the diﬀerent
treatments.
8Table 4: Average exclusion rates and costs
Exclusion rate Exclusion costs Proﬁt incumbent Proﬁt buyers
SimNon 0.53 (0.10) 286 (20) 143 (24) 791 (47)
SimDis 0.59 (0.03) 254 (9) 166 (8) 755 (13)
Seq-P 0.81 (0.04) 248 (11) 214 (17) 658 (26)
Seq-S 0.74 (0.08) 261 (11) 194 (20) 693 (36)
Note: Averages across all data points are reported. Standard errors of the mean are in parentheses
where each matching group is counted as an independent observation.
4.1. Exclusion rates and costs: aggregate results
Table 4 gives an overview of aggregate exclusion rates and costs and proﬁts of incumbents and buyers
averaged across all data points for the diﬀerent treatments. The table shows that the exclusion rates
in SimNon and SimDis are 53% and 59%, respectively. Table 4 also shows that in the sequential
regimes, the exclusion rates are overall at least 15% higher than in both (non-discriminatory and
discriminatory) simultaneous regimes. In particular, in Seq-P the exclusion rate is equal to 81% and
in Seq-S it is equal to 74%. We also see that the costs of exclusion (i.e., the sum of the accepted
oﬀers given exclusion) for incumbents are on average between 248 and 261 in the three discriminatory
treatments (SimDis, Seq-P, and Seq-S) and somewhat higher (286) in SimNon.19 The observed
exclusion rates and costs translate into proﬁts of incumbents being highest in the sequential regimes
and those of buyers being highest in the simultaneous regimes.
In order to test whether—compared to the baseline treatment SimNon—the eﬀects of discrimina-
tion, sequentiality and secrecy on the exclusion rate and exclusion costs are statistically signiﬁcant,
we estimate regressions for the exclusion rate and exclusion costs. The regressions include dummies
that refer to discrimination (Dis), sequentiality (Seq), and secrecy (Secret). They also include a time
trend (Period) and interactions between the dummies and the time trend in order to allow for diﬀer-
ent dynamics across the diﬀerent conditions. For the exclusion rate, we estimate the following logit
regression model:
P(Exclusionijt) = F(0 + 1Disij + 2Seqij + 3Secretij + 4Period + 5Period  Disijt
+6Period  Seqijt + 7Period  Secretijt + i + ij + "ijt); (1)
19The average exclusion costs in the sequential treatments conditional on exclusion are, respectively, 213 (s.d. 77) in
Seq-P and 222 (s.d. 69) in Seq-S in the case buyer 1 accepts and, respectively, 346 (s.d. 11) in Seq-P and 350 (s.d. 47)
in Seq-S in the case buyer 1 rejects the incumbent’s oﬀer.
9where P(Exclusionijt) is the probability of observing exclusion in matching group i = 1 to 22, seller
j = 1 to 3, and period t = 1 to 20. F represents the logit function. With respect to exclusion costs,
we estimate the following linear model:
ExclusionCostijt = 0 + 1Disij + 2Seqij + 3Secretij + 4Period + 5Period  Disijt
+6Period  Seqijt + 7Period  Secretijt + i + ij + "ijt; (2)
with i = 1 to 22 matching groups, j = 1 to 3 sellers, and t = 1 to 20 periods.
The benchmark treatment is SimNon. In both regression models, we take into account that
groups of one seller and two buyers are nested in matching groups by including nested random seller
eﬀects, which are assumed to be independently normally distributed (cf. i and ij). Estimating
these models allows us to test whether the eﬀect of discrimination, sequentiality and secrecy are
statistically signiﬁcant, taking into account all data points and a time trend that potentially diﬀers
across treatments. The regression results are presented in Table 5.20
We ﬁrst consider the results related to the exclusion rates. Table 5 shows that discrimination
alone is not suﬃcient to increase the probability of exclusion above the level observed in the non-
discriminatory regime (SimNon). The table also shows that the coeﬃcient for sequentiality is statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which implies that for discrimination to increase the probability of
exclusion, sequentiality is needed. That the coeﬃcient of Secret is not signiﬁcant suggests that secrecy
of contracts does not have any signiﬁcant additional eﬀect on the probability of exclusion on top of
sequentiality (and discrimination). Finally, in all three discriminatory regimes there is a marginally
signiﬁcant upward time trend in probability of exclusion. Our ﬁrst results can thus be summarized as
follows:
Result 1 (i) Exclusion rates in simultaneous discriminatory and non-discriminatory regimes are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. (ii) Exclusion rates in sequential discriminatory regimes are signiﬁcantly higher
than in the non-discriminatory regime. (iii) Exclusion rates in sequential discriminatory regimes are
signiﬁcantly higher than in the simultaneous discriminatory regime.
Result 1(i) basically conﬁrms an earlier result in Spier and Landeo (2009) that discrimination per
se does not increase the exclusion rate.21 Results 1(ii) and 1(iii) are new. Result 1(ii) is in line with
20Using a linear regression model to estimate the treatment eﬀects on the exclusion rate gives the same qualitative
results.
21Our treatment SimNon corresponds to their treatment “EN/ND/NC” while our treatment SimDis-P corresponds to
their treatment “EN/D/NC”. Note, however, that the parametrization of the underlying markets as well as other design
details diﬀer between the two studies.
10Table 5: Exclusion rate and costs: regression results
Exclusion rates Exclusion costs
Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.)
Constant  0.020 (0.248) 234.8 (19.2)
Dis  0.179 (0.334)  18.5 (25.7)
Seq 0.934 (0.343)  52.1 (23.9)
Secret  0.381 (0.350)  11.3 (23.1)
Period 0.008 (0.013) 4.1 (1.2)
PeriodDis 0.034 (0.018)  0.7 (1.6)
PeriodSeq  0.018 (0.019)  5.7 (1.4)
PeriodSecret 0.015 (0.021) 2.6 (1.4)
log L  747.396  5230.782
# data points 1320 879
Note: The table reports the results from estimation of models (1) and (2). , , and  refer to rejection of
H0 : k = 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
the theoretical prediction. Result 1(iii), on the contrary, is not. Indeed, whereas theory does not
predict exclusion to be sensitive to the type of disciminatory regime, the experiment reveals that a
necessary condition for discrimination to facilitate exclusion is that contracts are oﬀered sequentially.
Why doesn’t the possibility of discrimination between buyers alone signiﬁcantly increase the inci-
dence of exclusion, but, rather, does it also take sequentiality of oﬀers to do so? A possible reason is
that without sequentiality, buyers still have the possibility to coordinate on the more eﬃcient entry
outcome in the buyers’ subgame. Indeed, when the incumbent’s oﬀers are both below 336, the buyers’
subgame is a coordination game. In the sequential treatments, the buyers never play a coordination
game. In Section 4.2 we not only show that the buyers’ subgame is often a coordination game in
SimDis, but also that, on average, incumbents make higher proﬁts when proposing oﬀers that turn
the buyers’ subgame into a coordination game than when proposing divide-and-conquer oﬀers.22
22In another set of sessions we implemented the naked exclusion games in a within-subject design. Here, all subjects
ﬁrst play the non-discriminatory regime before playing (with the player roles kept ﬁxed) one of the three discriminatory
regimes. The comparative statics are the same as in this study, except that sequential contracting alone is not suﬃcient
to obtain a higher exclusion rate. Instead, it only increases exclusion rates over those in simultaneous regimes if the
contract terms oﬀered to the ﬁrst buyer are unknown to the second buyer (cf. Seq-S). The fact that in this other
experiment subjects ﬁrst play the non-discriminatory game, where exclusion is not guaranteed, may make behavior in
11With respect to exclusion costs (the sum of accepted oﬀers), the estimation results in Table 5 indi-
cate that costs are signiﬁcantly lower in the sequential regimes than in SimNon. Discrimination alone
also decreases exclusion costs, but not signiﬁcantly so. Furthermore, exclusion costs increase signiﬁ-
cantly over time in the simultaneous (non-discriminatory and discriminatory) regimes, and decrease
signiﬁcantly over time in Seq-P. These comparisons are thus partly in line with the comparative stat-
ics as predicted by theory. However, it is clear that also under sequential contracting exclusion costs
are substantially above zero—a ﬁnding we come back to in Section 4.2. We summarize our second
result as follows.
Result 2 While in the sequential regimes exclusion costs are signiﬁcantly lower than in SimNon,
exclusion generally comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent.
How do our results translate into payoﬀs of the incumbent and buyers? The incumbent’s proﬁt
increases signiﬁcantly over time in the discriminatory regimes (p = 0:097 in regression of the type in
equation 2) and not so in SimNon. Buyers are worse oﬀ under sequentiality. They are estimated
to earn 98 points less in the sequential treatments than in SimNon (p = 0:046 in regression of the
type in equation 2). Moreover, proﬁt of buyers decreases signiﬁcantly over time in the discriminatory
treatments and not so in SimNon.
4.2. Behavior of incumbents and buyers
In this subsection we look more closely at behavior of incumbents and buyers in the diﬀerent treat-
ments. In particular, we study the distribution of amounts oﬀered by incumbents and acceptance
rates of buyers. Table 6 shows the distribution of oﬀers made by incumbents and the acceptance rates
of buyers for the four games separately (see Appendix A.1 for histograms). Oﬀers are grouped into
intervals ([1-35], [35-135], etc.). For SimNon, where incumbents made just one oﬀer relevant for both
buyers, Table 6 shows the distribution of these oﬀers and corresponding acceptance rates in brackets.
For SimDis, Table 6 shows the distribution of all oﬀers made, neglecting the fact that each incumbent
always made two oﬀers at a time. We do this in an eﬀort to have one consistent way of displaying
the results across the four diﬀerent games. For more information on the distribution of pairs of oﬀers
(minimum and maximum oﬀer) in SimDis, and the associated exclusion rates, we refer to Table A1
subsequently played discriminatory games more “sticky”. Indeed, the relatively favorable outcomes for buyers obtained
in the non-discriminatory game may form an aspiration for outcomes in games played thereafter, such that more than
sequentiality alone is needed to break coordination between buyers. The data of the current between-subject design
supersedes the one of the earlier within-subject design. We report on the latter in Boone, M¨ uller and Suetens (2009).
12Table 6: Distribution of oﬀers (in %) and acceptance rates
0-35 36-135 136-235 236-335 > 335 total # avg. oﬀera
SimNon 1.0 7.3 81.3 10.0 0.3 100 600 194.1
[0.00] [0.05] [0.36] [0.48] [1.00] [0.35] (6.8)
SimDis 30.6 20.8 24.2 10.8 13.6 100 720 142.9
[0.09] [0.31] [0.40] [0.54] [0.71] [0.34] (5.3)
Seq-P
to buyer 1 5.0 22.7 43.7 27.3 1.3 100 300 182.3
[0.00] [0.43] [0.63] [0.82] [1.00] [0.61] (7.1)
to buyer 2 after 1 reject 8.5 11.0 6.8 10.2 63.5 100 118 277.7
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.33] [0.75] [0.51] (25.5)
to buyer 2 after 1 accept 96.7 2.7 0.0 0.6 0.0 100 182 5.8
[0.59] [0.80] - [1.00] - [0.60] (2.4)
Seq-S
to buyer 1 7.2 18.1 50.0 19.7 5.0 100 360 186.1
[0.04] [0.31] [0.60] [0.69] [1.00] [0.54] (10.8)
to buyer 2 after 1 reject 14.6 5.5 9.8 14.6 55.5 100 164 276.4
[0.00] [0.00] [0.13] [0.21] [0.70] [0.43] (28.3)
to buyer 2 after 1 accept 98.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 100 196 3.5
[0.36] [0.50] - [1.00] - [0.37] (1.5)
Note: The table reports observed frequencies of oﬀered amounts and average acceptance rates by buyers in
brackets. a Standard errors of the mean in parentheses.
in Appendix A.2. Moreover, for Seq-P and Seq-S we distinguish between oﬀers made to buyer 1, to
buyer 2 after buyer 1 rejected, and to buyer 2 after buyer 1 accepted. Finally, Table A1 also shows
average oﬀers.
Table 6 shows that in SimNon 81.3% (488 out of 600) of the oﬀers are between 136 and 235.
Moreover, the buyers’ acceptance rate increases as the amount oﬀered increases, which is consistent
with experimental evidence from coordination (stag hunt) games. Indeed, players in such games take
ceteris paribus less risk to coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium when the “risky” payoﬀ is lower or
the payoﬀ corresponding to the safe alternative is higher (see, e.g., Battalio, Samuelson and Huyck,
2001; Schmidt et al., 2003). Translated into the naked exclusion context, buyers take less risk to reject
an oﬀer made by the incumbent if the oﬀer, and thus the payoﬀ from accepting, is higher (see also
Smith, 2010; Spier and Landeo, 2009).
With respect to SimDis, we see in Table 6 that the distribution of oﬀered amounts is diﬀerent
13from SimNon. The majority of oﬀers (30.6%) now falls within the range [0,35]. This peak partly
stems from divide-and-conquer oﬀers of incumbents where one buyer is oﬀered a very small amount
(within the range [0,35]) and the other buyer an amount higher than 335, which makes it a dominant
strategy to accept in the subgame. From all oﬀer combinations, about 27% correspond to divide-
and-conquer strategies (97 out of 360). As shown in Table A1 in Appendix A.2, the exclusion rate is
among the highest for strategies where the minimum oﬀer is within the range [0,35] and the maximum
oﬀer above 335.23 All other oﬀer combinations (with the exception of one observation) transform
the buyers’ subgame into a coordination game. These are pairs of oﬀers where the maximum oﬀer is
below 335. About 73% of the oﬀer combinations (262 out of 360) are such that the buyers’ subgame
is a coordination game (see again Table A1).24 Interestingly, incumbents who use divide-and-conquer
oﬀers earn on average much less than incumbents who do not use these, particularly compared to
incumbents who propose combinations of (suﬃciently high) oﬀers that create a coordination game in
the buyers’ decision stage. To illustrate, the average proﬁt calculated across all divide-and-conquer
oﬀers is 119, whereas it is 183 across all other oﬀers, and 208 across all combinations of oﬀers for which
each of the two individual oﬀers lie in the interval between 36 and 236.25 This suggests that it might
be a clever strategy for incumbents to avoid divide-and-conquer oﬀers.
With respect to the sequential games Seq-P and Seq-S, Table 6 shows that the majority of
amounts (44% and 50%, respectively) oﬀered to buyer 1 again lies in the range [136, 235], which
is far above the theoretical prediction of zero or one. Amounts oﬀered to buyer 2, however, are
somewhat more in line with what is to be expected from a rational, payoﬀ-maximizing incumbent.
This is certainly true when buyer 1 has accepted, in which case very low amounts are oﬀered to
buyer 2. Also, when buyer 1 has rejected we see that in the majority of cases amounts above 335
are oﬀered. But we also observe a sizeable fraction of (much) lower oﬀers, which might be explained
by the incumbent “taking a shot” (see the relation to ultimatum games elaborated on below). The
reason why incumbents oﬀer relatively large amounts to buyers 1 is most likely that the latter (almost)
never accept “low” oﬀers. Indeed, in Seq-P and Seq-S, buyers 1 almost never accept oﬀers below 35.
23Spier and Landeo (2009) observe these divide-and-conquer oﬀers more frequently than we do, which is, arguably, not
surprising given that in their paper the action space for the incumbent is restricted to four possible payments.
24As long as the sum of these oﬀers is below 336, they could be part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. However,
since the corresponding exclusion rates are well below 1, most of these cases are not part of a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
25These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0:001) in linear regressions where the incumbents’ proﬁt is regressed
on a divide-and-conquer dummy (including random eﬀects for individuals and matching groups, and standard errors
adjusted for potential dependency within matching groups).
14Basically, acceptance rates of buyers 1 are positively related to the size of the oﬀer, for both Seq-P
and Seq-S, and incumbents seem to realize this.
The relation between oﬀers and acceptance rates also appears in ultimatum game experiments
where one typically sees a positive relation between proposers’ oﬀers and responders’ acceptance
rates (see G¨ uth, 1995; Roth, 1995, for overviews). Anticipating this, most proposers oﬀer substantial
amounts to the responder. An incumbent knows that once his oﬀer to buyer 1 is rejected, he needs
to make a very large oﬀer to buyer 2 to achieve exclusion with certainty and this would make him
earn only very little. Hence, anticipating rejections of small payments by buyer 1 that result in “low”
proﬁts, the incumbent appears to oﬀer relatively high amounts to buyer 1 in order to convince him to
accept.26
5. Conclusion
We ﬁnd that in the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and
Segal and Whinston (2000b) with two buyers, an incumbent who proposes exclusive contracts to buyers
sequentially, is better able to deter entry than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously.
Thus, in contrast to the theoretical predictions, it is not discrimination per se that increases the
exclusion rate. Rather, it is the combination of discrimination and sequentiality of contracting that
increases the exclusion rate. Furthermore, when the oﬀered amounts are too low, also under sequential
contracting buyers reject oﬀers. Therefore, also under sequential contracting, the incumbent carries a
substantial cost for excluding rivals.
Our results are relevant for antitrust policy. Indeed, exclusivity clauses are not necessarily aimed at
foreclosure but can also have an eﬃciency rationale. Besanko and Perry (1993) and Segal and Whinston
(2000a), for example, show that such clauses can enhance manufacturers’ incentives to invest. There-
fore, regulatory bodies and courts have to judge which of the two eﬀects of exclusive contracts—the
26An alternative but related and more formal explanation for the high oﬀers to buyer 1 is based on a simple bargaining
mechanism in which players share surplus from “trade”. Using backward induction, we ﬁrst consider the second buyer.
The surplus created by the incumbent and buyer 2 equals S2 = 500 + 165   (500 + 50) = 115. Using Nash bargaining
with—for concreteness—a 50:50 split of the surplus leads to an oﬀer x2 = 392:5 and a surplus for the incumbent equal
to 107.5. Now consider buyer 1. The surplus created at this stage equals S1 = 500+165 (107:5+165) = 392:5. Again
using Nash bargaining with a 50:50 split of the surplus leads to x1 = 196:25. This prediction is not too far from the
average observed oﬀers: 182 in Seq-P and 186 in Seq-S. But the oﬀer of x2 = 392:5 to buyer 2 after buyer 1 rejected
compares less favorably to the average observed oﬀers: 274 in Seq-P and 263 in Seq-S. Apparently buyer 2 has less
bargaining power than the 50:50 we assumed.
15eﬃciency-enhancing or the foreclosure eﬀect—outweighs the other.27 This task is not straightforward
and, in this respect, our results provide some insights. In particular, we ﬁnd that the most eﬀective
way to achieve exclusion is to approach buyers sequentially. As there is no reason why eﬃciency-
enhancing or investment-protecting exclusivity clauses should be oﬀered sequentially to buyers, an
argument can be made that contracts oﬀered in this form should be interpreted as aiming at exclusion
only. For practical purposes, this would mean that an antitrust authority should be on high alert if
the suspected company staggered its contracting with buyers over a certain period of time to get the
required sequencing of oﬀers (see also Whinston, 2006, p. 147f).
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(d) Oﬀers to Buyer 2 in Seq after Buyer 1 rejected
19A.2. Distribution of minimum and maximum oﬀers in SimDis
Table A1: Frequency of minimum and maximum oﬀers and exclusion rates in SimDis
max oﬀer
min oﬀer 0-35 36-135 136-235 236-335 > 335 total
0-35 10 8 31 64 97 210
[0.10] [0.00] [0.19] [0.63] [0.72] [0.56]
36-135 - 49 36 7 1 93
- [0.49] [0.61] [0.86] [1.00] [0.57]
136-235 - - 50 7 0 57
- - [0.72] [0.86] - [0.74]
total 10 57 117 78 98 360
[0.10] [0.42] [0.55] [0.67] [0.72] [0.59]
Note: The table reports for SimDis observed frequencies of minimum and maximum oﬀers and average exclusion
rates by buyers in parentheses.
20A.3. Instructions
A.3.1. General for all treatments
 Please read these instructions closely.
 Do not talk to your neighbours and remain quiet during the entire experiment.
 If you have a question, raise your hand. We will come up to you to answer it.
 In this experiment you can earn money by interacting with other participants.
 Your earnings are measured in “Points.” The number of points that you earn depends on the
decisions that you and other participants make.
 For every 500 Points you earn, you will be paid 10 DKK in cash.
 You will start the experiment with 1600 Points in your account.
 Your total number of points at the end of the experiment will be equal to the sum of the points
you have earned in each round plus the show-up fee.
 Your identity will remain anonymous to us as well as to the other participants.
A.3.2. Speciﬁc for SimNon
The experiment consists of 20 rounds. The events in each round are as follows:
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 participants. In
each group, one participant will act in role A and two participants will act in role B. Then there will
be two stages:
Stage 1: The A participant can oﬀer each of the two B participants in his group a payment of X  0:
The payment X is the same for both B participants.
Stage 2: The two B participants will be informed about X: Then both B participants simultaneously
and independently have to decide whether to accept or reject this payment.
Payoﬀs
The payoﬀs of the A participant
Imagine that you are an A participant and that you oﬀer the payment X  0. Then your payoﬀs





If the two B’s
accept
50 500   X 500   2X
This means:
 If none of the B participants accepts the oﬀer, you earn 50;
 If only one B participant accepts the oﬀer, you earn 500   X;
 If the two B participants accept the oﬀer, you earn 500   2X;
 Please note that as an A participant you can make losses. This is the case when only one B
participant accepts and the payment X is larger than 500 or when both B participants accept
and the payment X is larger than 250.
The payoﬀs of the B participants
Imagine that you are a B participant and imagine that you choose rows (Accept or Reject) in the
table below. Then your payoﬀs as a B participant are as follows:





Your decision as Accept 165 + X 165 + X
participant B Reject 165 500
This means:
 If you choose “Accept,” you earn 165 + X (whether the other B participant accepts or rejects.)
 If you choose “Reject,” your payoﬀ depends on what the other B participant chooses.
– If the other B participant accepts, you earn 165:
– If the other B participant rejects, you earn 500:
22Role assignment and information
 The experiment consists of 20 rounds.
 Your role as either an A or a B participant will be determined at the beginning of the experiment
and then remains ﬁxed for the entire experiment.
 Your computer screen (see the top line) indicates which role you act in.
 Please remember that in every round, groups of 3 participants are randomly selected from the
pool of participants in the room. We will make sure that each of the groups will always consist
of one A participant and two B participants.
 At the end of each round, you will be given the following information about what happened in
your own group during the round: the oﬀer made by the A participant, the decisions of the two
B participants, and your own payoﬀ.
A.3.3. Speciﬁc for SimDis
The experiment consists of 20 rounds. The events in each round are as follows:
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 participants. In each
group, one participant will act in role A and two participants will act in role B. The two participants
acting in role B will be called B1 and B2. Then there will be two stages:
Stage 1: The A participant can oﬀer each of the two B participants in his group a payment. That
is, the A participant can oﬀer B1 a payment X1  0 and B2 a payment of X2  0: The two
payments X1 and X2 can be the same or they can be diﬀerent.
Stage 2: The two B participants will be informed about X1 and X2: Then both B participants
simultaneously and independently have to decide whether to accept or to reject their own oﬀered
payment. That is, B1 decides whether to accept or to reject X1 and (at the same time) B2 decides
whether to accept or to reject X2:
Payoﬀs
The payoﬀs of the A participant
Imagine that you are an A participant and that you oﬀer the payments X1  0 and X2  0: Let






If the two B’s
accept
50 500   Xi 500   X1   X2
This means:
 If none of the B participants accepts the oﬀer, you earn 50.
 If only participant Bi (i = 1;2) accepts the oﬀer, you earn 500   Xi;
 If the two B participants accept the oﬀer, you earn 500   X1   X2;
 Please note that as an A participant you can make losses. This is the case when only participant
Bi (i = 1;2) accepts and the payment Xi is larger than 500 or when both B participants accept
and the sum of the payments X1 and X2 is larger than 500.
The payoﬀs of the B participants
Imagine that you are participant Bi (i = 1;2) who is oﬀered the payment Xi (i = 1;2) by the
A participant, and imagine that you choose rows (Accept or Reject) in the table below. Then your
payoﬀs as participant Bi are as follows:





Your decision as Accept 165 + Xi 165 + Xi
participant Bi Reject 165 500
This means:
 If you choose “Accept,” you earn 165+Xi (whether the other B participant accepts or rejects.)
 If you choose “Reject,” your payoﬀ depends on what the other B participant chooses.
– If the other B participant accepts, you earn 165:
– If the other B participant rejects, you earn 500:
Role assignment and information
24 The experiment consists of 20 rounds.
 Your role as either an A or a B participant will be determined at the beginning of the experiment
and then remains ﬁxed for the entire experiment. As a B participant you will alternate acting
in role B1 and role B2 across rounds. That is, if you are B1 (or B2) in round 1, you will be B2
(or B1) in round 2. Then, in round 3 you will again be B1 (or B2) and so on.
 Your computer screen (see the top line) indicates in every round which role you act in.
 Please remember that in every round, groups of 3 participants are randomly selected from the
pool of participants in the room. We will make sure that each of the groups will always consist
of one A participant and two B participants.
 At the end of each round, you will be given the following information about what happened in
your own group during the round: the oﬀers made by the A participant to the two B participants,
the decisions of the two B participants, and your own payoﬀ.
A.3.4. Speciﬁc for Seq-P
The experiment consists of 20 rounds. The events in each round are as follows:
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 participants. In each
group, one participant will act in role A and two participants will act in role B. The two participants
acting in role B will be called B1 and B2. Then there will be four stages:
Stage 1: The A participant can oﬀer the B1 participant in his group a payment. That is, the A
participant can oﬀer B1 a payment X1  0:
Stage 2: The B1 participant will be informed about X1: Then the B1 participant has to decide
whether to accept or to reject the oﬀered payment. That is, the B1 participant decides whether
to accept or to reject X1:
Stage 3: The A participant will be informed about whether B1 has accepted or rejected the oﬀer
X1. Then the A participant can oﬀer the B2 participant in his group a payment. That is, the
A participant can oﬀer B2 a payment X2  0:
Stage 4: The B2 participant will be informed both about X1 and X2 as well as about whether the
B1 participant has accepted or rejected the payment X1. Then the B2 participant has to decide
25whether to accept or to reject the oﬀered payment. That is, B2 decides whether to accept or to
reject X2.
Payoﬀs
The payoﬀs of the A participant
Imagine that you are an A participant and that you oﬀer the payments X1  0 and X2  0: Let






If the two B’s
accept
50 500   Xi 500   X1   X2
This means:
 If none of the B participants accepts the oﬀer, you earn 50.
 If only participant Bi (i = 1;2) accepts the oﬀer, you earn 500   Xi;
 If the two B participants accept the oﬀer, you earn 500   X1   X2;
 Please note that as an A participant you can make losses. This is the case when only participant
Bi (i = 1;2) accepts and the payment Xi is larger than 500 or when both B participants accept
and the sum of the payments X1 and X2 is larger than 500.
The payoﬀs of the B participants
Imagine that you are participant Bi (i = 1;2) who is oﬀered the payment Xi (i = 1;2) by the
A participant, and imagine that you choose rows (Accept or Reject) in the table below. Then your
payoﬀs as participant Bi are as follows:





Your decision as Accept 165 + Xi 165 + Xi
participant Bi Reject 165 500
This means:
26 If you choose “Accept,” you earn 165+Xi (whether the other B participant accepts or rejects.)
 If you choose “Reject,” your payoﬀ depends on what the other B participant chooses.
– If the other B participant accepts, you earn 165:
– If the other B participant rejects, you earn 500:
Role assignment and information during the experiment
 The experiment consists of 20 rounds.
 Your role as either an A or a B participant will be determined at the beginning of the experiment
and then remains ﬁxed for the entire experiment. As a B participant you will alternate acting
in role B1 and role B2 across rounds. That is, if you are B1 (or B2) in round 1, you will be B2
(or B1) in round 2. Then, in round 3 you will again be B1 (or B2) and so on.
 Your computer screen (see the top line) indicates in every round which role you act in.
 Please remember that in every round, groups of 3 participants are randomly selected from the
pool of participants in the room. We will make sure that each of the groups will always consist
of one A participant and two B participants.
 At the end of each round, you will be given the following information about what happened in
your own group during the round: the oﬀers made by the A participant to the two B participants,
the decisions of the two B participants, and your own payoﬀ.
A.3.5. Speciﬁc for Seq-S
The experiment consists of 20 rounds. The events in each round are as follows:
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 participants. In each
group, one participant will act in role A and two participants will act in role B. The two participants
acting in role B will be called B1 and B2. Then there will be four stages:
Stage 1: The A participant can oﬀer the B1 participant in his group a payment. That is, the A
participant can oﬀer B1 a payment X1  0:
Stage 2: The B1 participant will be informed about X1: Then the B1 participant has to decide
whether to accept or to reject the oﬀered payment. That is, the B1 participant decides whether
to accept or to reject X1:
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X1. Then the A participant can oﬀer the B2 participant in his group a payment. That is, the
A participant can oﬀer B2 a payment X2  0:
Stage 4: The B2 participant will be informed about X2 (not about X1) as well as about whether
the B1 participant has accepted or rejected his payment. Then the B2 participant has to decide
whether to accept or to reject the oﬀered payment. That is, B2 decides whether to accept or to
reject X2.
Payoﬀs
The payoﬀs of the A participant
Imagine that you are an A participant and that you oﬀer the payments X1  0 and X2  0: Let






If the two B’s
accept
50 500   Xi 500   X1   X2
This means:
 If none of the B participants accepts the oﬀer, you earn 50.
 If only participant Bi (i = 1;2) accepts the oﬀer, you earn 500   Xi;
 If the two B participants accept the oﬀer, you earn 500   X1   X2;
 Please note that as an A participant you can make losses. This is the case when only participant
Bi (i = 1;2) accepts and the payment Xi is larger than 500 or when both B participants accept
and the sum of the payments X1 and X2 is larger than 500.
The payoﬀs of the B participants
Imagine that you are participant Bi (i = 1;2) who is oﬀered the payment Xi (i = 1;2) by the
A participant, and imagine that you choose rows (Accept or Reject) in the table below. Then your
28payoﬀs as participant Bi are as follows:





Your decision as Accept 165 + Xi 165 + Xi
participant Bi Reject 165 500
This means:
 If you choose “Accept,” you earn 165+Xi (whether the other B participant accepts or rejects.)
 If you choose “Reject,” your payoﬀ depends on what the other B participant chooses.
– If the other B participant accepts, you earn 165:
– If the other B participant rejects, you earn 500:
Role assignment and information during the experiment
 The experiment consists of 20 rounds.
 Your role as either an A or a B participant will be determined at the beginning of the experiment
and then remains ﬁxed for the entire experiment. As a B participant you will alternate acting
in role B1 and role B2 across rounds. That is, if you are B1 (or B2) in round 1, you will be B2
(or B1) in round 2. Then, in round 3 you will again be B1 (or B2) and so on.
 Your computer screen (see the top line) indicates in every round which role you act in.
 Please remember that in every round, groups of 3 participants are randomly selected from the
pool of participants in the room. We will make sure that each of the groups will always consist
of one A participant and two B participants.
 At the end of each round, you will be given the following information about what happened in
your own group during the round: the oﬀer made to you by the A participant (in case you are
a B participant), the decisions of the two B participants, and your own payoﬀ.
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